Finding endangered people in time

Let Cars Do the Watching — Without Tracking Anyone

Putting Texas emergency alerts into connected cars, with a ban on collecting plate data.

DRAFT — not filed  Proposed bill for the 90th Texas Legislature · Adds Texas Government Code §411.481 · Last updated November 5, 2026

The problem

Texas alerts — AMBER, Silver, CLEAR, and Blue — succeed or fail on one thing: whether someone spots the vehicle named in the alert, fast. The system was built on human eyes. Highway dynamic message signs carry the alert to the road, and drivers watch for the vehicle. In 2017, when Cayley Mandadi was killed, her killer drove past dozens of those signs — and no alert could be issued for Cayley at all, because she was fourteen months too old for an AMBER Alert and Silver Alerts were restricted to people 65 and older. Her mother, Alison Steele, closed that gap by getting the C.L.E.A.R. Alert passed.

Now the eyes themselves are going away. As cars take over more of the driving, the people in them stop watching the road — that is the point of the technology. The human eyeball network these alerts depend on gets thinner every year, and nothing replaces it.

What the bill does

The bill directs the Department of Public Safety (DPS) to publish a secure, digitally signed feed of every active AMBER, Silver, CLEAR, and Blue alert — all four from day one — and invites any connected vehicle or service to join voluntarily, at any level of automation. The technical implementation is set by DPS rulemaking: DPS leads, because it administers all four alerts, and the Texas Department of Transportation is a statutory consultee, not the rulemaker. The safeguards below are the price of access to the feed, and they are written into the statute itself, not left to rules.

A participating vehicle compares plates it sees against the alert list only, on the vehicle itself. Occupied vehicles notify their occupants, and the occupants decide whether to report. Unoccupied vehicles report automatically. If the vehicle itself is the one named in an alert: an unoccupied vehicle quietly notifies DPS, its remote assistance centre, and its owner, and keeps driving; an occupied vehicle makes no report about itself at all.

The phase-in is deliberate, because no machine-readable feed currently exists for any alert. DPS rules are due by June 1, 2028, and the manufacturer feed duty begins March 1, 2029 — with earlier launch permitted, alert by alert. The voluntary feed, with its binding safeguards, is the permanent base of the system. As a severable backstop, new model generations — only new model generations — could later be required to take part, with exemptions the Governor or a designee must grant for up to five years on a first request. Manufacturers certify their own compliance. Incentives to join early include good-faith immunity for reporters, credit for participation if the backstop ever takes effect, and alert capability counted in state fleet purchasing.

Why it works

Nothing here needs inventing. Alert feeds already reach car dashboards and navigation apps. And Texas law already directs DPS to recruit private companies to help spread alerts — Government Code §411.464 has said so since the CLEAR Alert was created. This bill simply extends that recruitment to vehicles. Participation is open to ordinary connected cars and apps — where the near-term sightings are — not only to the small number of highly automated vehicles.

Vehicles cannot receive Wireless Emergency Alerts — that system reaches phones, not cars — so the bill speaks of "connected services," the data connection vehicles already have.

Rights and safeguards

How hard will this be to pass?

High — 4 of 5

This is the most novel bill in the package: it asks a major industry to build something new, and the generation-triggered backstop will draw the strongest fight even though it is severable and years away. Privacy advocates will scrutinise anything that scans plates — fairly — and the bill's answer is architectural rather than rhetorical, which takes time to explain in a committee hearing. The voluntary design, the long phase-in, and the fact that the alerts themselves command broad support keep passage possible, but no one should champion this bill expecting an easy session.

Cost

Small. The state's cost is DPS building and running the feed. Participation is voluntary, the incentives are legal rather than cash, and there are no subsidies or tax abatements.

What we need — and the next step

Nothing is expected of any group. If this bill fits your mission, we are asking victims' advocacy organisations to champion it, endorse it, testify for it, or simply advise on it — and members of the 90th Legislature to consider authoring it. The choice is entirely yours.

Next step: a 20-minute briefing with Lawrence Baitland — and then your yes or no on championing this bill.

Download the one-page summary (PDF)

Reading on? Below this line the page goes deeper: first a fuller brief for advocates preparing to pitch this bill inside their own organisation, then a technical appendix for attorneys and legislative staff.

Layer 2 — The advocacy brief

For advocates preparing to pitch this bill: the fuller picture, the arguments against it stated fairly, and our answers.

How this gap in the law actually plays out

Content note: this section states, plainly and without detail, the facts of the case this bill grew out of.

Cayley Mandadi was killed on October 29, 2017. On the day she died, her killer drove past dozens of highway dynamic message signs — the signs Texas uses to tell everyone on the road to be on the lookout. But no alert could be issued for Cayley: she was fourteen months too old for an AMBER Alert, and Silver Alerts were restricted to people 65 and older. She fell into the gap between the two systems, and not one of those signs carried anything for her. Her mother, Alison Steele, closed that gap by getting the C.L.E.A.R. Alert passed — the alert for missing adults in danger.

Every Texas alert still rests on the same unstated assumption: somebody has to be looking. A sign works only if a driver reads it, remembers the vehicle, and recognises it in traffic. That assumption is expiring. As vehicles assume more of the driving task, drivers will spend less time looking out of their windows — not a failure of the technology, but the technology working as intended. The bill's findings put the answer plainly: the sensors and connected services of modern vehicles can replace that diminishing human observation — the vehicles' digital eyes can do the watching that drivers will no longer do — if the state publishes alert information in a form vehicles can use, and if participation is structured to protect the privacy of Texans.

Two halves make up the proposal, and advocates should keep them visibly separate. The display half — getting alert information onto dashboards — already exists in the market: alert feeds already reach infotainment screens and navigation apps, and Texas law already directs DPS to recruit private companies to help spread alerts. The matching half — a vehicle comparing the plates around it against the short list of plates in active alerts — is the new and contested step, and it is the half the safeguards are written for. Participation is open at any level of automation, including ordinary connected cars and apps, because that is where the near-term sightings are. The highly automated vehicles matter most over time, because only a machine that is itself watching the road can scan plates continuously without distracting a human driver. Do not overclaim near-term coverage: the rescue value in the first years comes mostly from ordinary connected vehicles joining voluntarily.

Likely criticism — and our answers

You will meet these arguments in committee, in the press, and possibly inside your own organisation. Each is stated in its strongest fair form. The expected sources are privacy and civil-liberties organisations (the Electronic Frontier Foundation's stated position is that automated license plate readers are mass surveillance and should be shut down; the ACLU has likewise called for ending license plate surveillance — both are documented positions on plate readers generally; neither organisation has taken a position on this bill), manufacturer and automotive associations (the Alliance for Automotive Innovation is on record demanding national standards instead of state-by-state vehicle regulation), incumbent plate-reader vendors, and some law-enforcement users of existing plate-reader systems, whose likely concerns are described below as inference from their public records. Naming a likely critic is a different thing from naming an ally: no critic is misrepresented by being expected to argue its own stated mission.

"However you dress it up, this is mass surveillance. You are authorising millions of cars to scan every plate around them — and function creep is not a risk, it is the historical pattern."

Stated at full strength, because the record behind it is real. Plate-reader systems sold on narrow promises have been searched for reasons far outside them: in May 2025, a Texas sheriff's office searched more than 83,000 plate-reader cameras nationwide with the stated reason "had an abortion." In 2026 the Governor ordered state agencies to halt state funding for the largest vendor's cameras, and the Comptroller barred grant funds he administers from buying major plate-reader products, saying the government has no business tracking where law-abiding Texans drive. The critics' conclusion — the only safe plate reader is no plate reader — follows from that record, and this bill does not ask them to pretend otherwise.

The answer is that every abuse in that record was an abuse of a database, and this bill prohibits the database. Matching happens on the vehicle, in volatile memory, against the short DPS-signed list of plates in active alerts — and against nothing else: the statute forbids loading any other list, including warrant, immigration, toll, or repossession lists. A plate that does not match exactly is never written to storage, never transmitted, never logged; there is nothing retained for a future official to search, share, or creep with. Expanding the list would require a new act of the Legislature, debated in the open — which is where that fight belongs. Breaking the data rules brings a civil penalty, makes evidence derived from the violation inadmissible in any proceeding, and costs the participant its access to the feed. Full endorsement from abolitionist quarters is not expected and should not be claimed; the design goal is narrower and honest — the specific harms the critics document (retention, sharing, searching) are architecturally impossible here.

"This is a Texas-specific software mandate on a national industry — preempted by federal law, a patchwork burden, and a cost priced into every car."

This is the argument the industry coalition runs against every in-vehicle requirement, most recently against a federal AM-radio mandate, and it would be formidable against a bill that conscripted manufacturers. This bill does not. The permanent program imposes no vehicle standard at all: the state publishes a feed, and the safeguards bind participants as a condition of access to the state's own feed — a state benefit, accepted voluntarily. State fleet provisions rest on the federal exception for vehicles a government buys for its own use and reach nothing else. The only duty in the bill is the severable backstop: it applies to new model generations only, never to a vehicle already sold and never as a retrofit, so compliance is designed in at a redesign — the cheapest point in a vehicle's life. A first-request exemption must be granted for up to five years; a manufacturer already participating voluntarily is deemed compliant and never needs the exemption machinery at all; and if a federal safety standard ever occupies the same ground, the duty suspends by operation of law. If a court struck the backstop entirely, the voluntary program continues untouched — the backstop is severable precisely so that this argument has almost nothing to kill.

"Moving cars will misread plates — constantly. A false 'MATCH' on a dashboard will get an innocent driver followed, confronted, or stopped."

The engineering premise is fair and the bill concedes it in its design. Camera plate-reading from a moving vehicle is best for vehicles ahead and behind, in daylight and fair weather; dirty and obscured plates will be missed, and partial reads will happen. That is why a partial or near plate is a non-match by statute — it goes nowhere, not to DPS, not to any centre. An exact match is presented to occupants labelled as a possible match, with the DPS vehicle description to check against, and the standing instruction is: call 911, do not approach, follow, or confront anyone. A match report is a tip — the statute says it is not probable cause, justifies no stop by itself, and must be verified by the receiving agency before anyone acts on it. Notice presentation is audio-first and may not mask or compete with a request by an automated driving system for the human to take over. Missed reads cost sightings; misreads are channelled to verification, not confrontation; and no occupant is ever obliged to do anything at all.

"Today the list is missing children. Tomorrow it is warrants, immigration, toll debt. And once the data exists, the government will simply demand it."

Mission creep is the strongest long-run argument against this bill, and the answer has to be structural, not a promise — promises are what failed in the plate-reader record. So: the data does not exist. A non-match is discarded in memory and may not be written, transmitted, sold, or logged by the participant or any vendor working for it; there is no archive for a future agency to subpoena, and the honest answer to "the government will demand the database" is that the statute forbids creating one. The alert list is the only list that may be loaded, and DPS rulemaking — where quiet expansion would otherwise happen — is expressly barred from authorising non-alert data collection, expanding the six report fields, treating a partial plate as a match, or altering the occupied/unoccupied response rules: the safeguards are statutory and not delegable. Even the exemption machinery cannot dilute them — a manufacturer exempt from the duty to participate is still fully bound by the data rules the moment it touches the feed. Adding a new category of list would take a new bill, in the open, where the critics quoted above will be heard. That is the fight they are entitled to — then, in public — rather than a reason to leave endangered people unfindable now.

Potential allies

These are the kinds of organisation whose missions and records align with this bill. Organisations are deliberately not named here. A group that found its own name on a bill page could reasonably read it as being cited as a supporter, and no organisation has committed to this bill. Named research is kept in the project's working papers; a category below means a natural conversation to have, not a position taken.

DPS and TxDOT are institutional actors, not allies to be counted. DPS administers all four alerts and leads the rulemaking; TxDOT is the statutory consultee and operates the message signs. Their implementation questions will be the hardest-nosed in the process and should be welcomed early.

Prospective authors

To be published after re-verification. Candidates to approach — several members, identified from their records on transportation, alert, and privacy legislation in the 88th and 89th Legislatures — have been researched and are held in the project's working papers. Because the 2026 election changed the House, the governorship, and the Lieutenant Governorship, no names are published here until rosters and committee assignments for the 90th Legislature are verified in January. What can be said now: the strongest approach pairs the transportation subject-matter leadership with members who carried the C.L.E.A.R. Alert itself, and adds privacy-side coauthors from both parties to own the safeguard provisions.

Cost and implementation

The phase-in is deliberate, because no machine-readable feed currently exists for any Texas alert:

DPS leads the rulemaking, because it administers all four alerts; TxDOT is a statutory consultee, and a statutory technical advisory committee (participants, platform providers, law enforcement, TxDOT, victim advocacy, independent technical experts) advises on the specification. The state's cost is building and running the signed feed and administering self-certifications and the committee — a modest information-technology and program-administration cost. For scale, the fiscal note on the bill that created the CLEAR Alert itself found no significant fiscal implication; the feed is a new cost on top of existing alert infrastructure and the Legislative Budget Board will score it, so no precise figure is asserted here. The incentives are legal rather than cash — good-faith immunity, advance compliance credit, fleet purchasing consideration — with no subsidy, tax abatement, or appropriation. Fleet provisions are capped in practice by a "no greater lifecycle cost" condition and waiver grounds. Costs to manufacturers under the voluntary program are zero by definition; under the backstop they are mitigated by the generation trigger, the shall-grant first exemption, and the compliance credit.

Talking points

Questions advocates ask

Does the state get a database of where I drive?

No. There is no database to get. A participating vehicle compares plates it sees against the active alert list on the vehicle itself, in memory. A non-match is never collected, stored, or transmitted — the statute prohibits it — and a match report contains six fields about the observed vehicle and nothing else, with no location history of the reporting vehicle attached.

Does my car have to take part?

No. Participation is voluntary for every vehicle and service, at any level of automation. A duty exists only as a severable backstop for new model generations offered for sale after the Act takes effect — never for a car already on the road, never as a retrofit — and first-request exemptions from it must be granted for up to five years.

What happens if my own car is the vehicle named in an alert?

If anyone is in it: the car tells its occupants about the alert and makes no report of any kind — whether to contact any authority is solely the occupants' decision. If the vehicle is unoccupied, it quietly notifies DPS, its remote assistance centre, and its owner — and keeps driving. Nothing in the program stops, holds, restricts, or redirects the vehicle, and no response ever includes pursuing or blocking any vehicle.

What about partial plates — a dirty plate, or an alert that only has part of the number?

A partial or wildcard correspondence is a non-match for every purpose of the program. It may not be transmitted to DPS, to a remote assistance centre, or to anyone else. Only an exact match counts.

Does a match mean the police can stop that car?

Not on the match alone. A match report is a tip: the statute states it is not probable cause, does not by itself justify a stop or detention, and must be verified by the receiving agency before enforcement action. Occupants are instructed to call 911 and not to approach.

Layer 3 — Technical appendix

For attorneys, board reviewers, and legislative staff: current law, what belongs in statute and what is left to rule, what the draft changes, the legal analysis, and the seams we already know about.

Download the draft bill in Texas House format (PDF) — DRAFT, not filed

Current law

ProvisionWhat it does now
Gov't Code ch. 411, subch. L (§§411.351–411.359) — AMBER Alert The statewide system for abducted children and missing persons with intellectual disabilities. Section 411.354 directs DPS to recruit broadcasters, private commercial entities, state and local governmental entities, the public, and other appropriate persons to assist — the recruitment architecture this bill works inside.
Gov't Code ch. 411, subch. M (§§411.381–411.389) — Silver Alert Missing senior citizens (65+) and persons with Alzheimer's disease. Section 411.385 requires TxDOT to plan for alert information to be sent "through existing systems of dynamic message signs" — the channel this bill supplements. Section 411.384 carries the same recruitment duty for DPS.
Gov't Code ch. 411, subch. Q (§§411.461–411.470) — CLEAR Alert Missing adults (18–64) in danger. Added by HB 1769 (86th Leg., 2019); formally named by HB 2677 (87th Leg., 2021). Section 411.463 makes the DPS director statewide coordinator; §411.464 is the "Department to Recruit Participants" section and the statutory hook for vehicle participation; §411.470 limits TxDOT's participation role.
Gov't Code ch. 411, subch. O (§§411.441–411.449) — Blue Alert The alert for an offender who has killed or seriously injured a peace officer. (Section numbers verified; the subchapter letter is flagged for confirmation in Known seams, below.)
Gov't Code §411.464 and analogues (§§411.354, 411.384) Every alert subchapter directs DPS to recruit participants; none conscripts manufacturers. Vehicle manufacturers and navigation platforms are squarely "private commercial entities" DPS is already told to recruit — the bill extends that recruitment to a new class of participant and adds the feed and the safeguards, rather than asserting a new theory of state power.
Transp. Code ch. 545, subch. J (§§545.451–.459) — automated vehicles Texas's automated-vehicle framework (SB 2205, 85th Leg., 2017, since rewritten). As recodified effective September 1, 2025, §545.451 defines "automated driving system" by reference to SAE Levels 3, 4, and 5 and defines "minimal risk condition." The draft cross-references §545.451 rather than inventing its own automation definitions.
Plate data in Texas today Texas has no comprehensive ALPR statute — a 2026 compilation counted at least 28 states with statutes expressly addressing plate readers or retention; Texas is not among them. Retention is currently a matter of agency policy, DPS access agreements, and federal law. Transp. Code ch. 730 (the DPPA-implementing chapter) governs disclosure of personal information from motor-vehicle records held by an agency; it does not regulate capturing plates from public roads. Gov't Code §552.130 excepts motor-vehicle title/registration information from public disclosure. The 89th Legislature's two comprehensive ALPR bills — a 48-hour general-destruction model with a private right of action, and a warrant-requirement model — were referred to committee and never received a hearing.
Wireless Emergency Alerts / IPAWS WEA is delivered by wireless carriers to mobile handsets under FCC rules (47 C.F.R. Part 10); a vehicle is not a WEA device class. The bill therefore speaks of "connected services" — the vehicle's ordinary data connection. That alert feeds can drive in-vehicle displays is demonstrated, not theoretical: FEMA's IPAWS feed has been integrated with in-vehicle infotainment and mapping applications in production pilots.

What belongs in statute — and what is left to DPS rule

The governing split: provisions that create or limit legal rights, impose safeguards, penalties, or duties are in the statute, where only the Legislature can change them. Machinery — formats, protocols, forms, and mechanics — is delegated to DPS rulemaking, because code would fossilise it. The statute expressly bars rules from diluting the safeguards.

In the statuteLeft to DPS rule
The data prohibitions: no collecting, storing, or transmitting non-alert plate data; matching only on the vehicle, only against the alert list; a partial plate is a non-match; no other list may be loaded (§411.474). The feed specification: data format, digital-signature method, and transmission method for the alert feed (§411.481(a)(1)) — published as an open specification on the same terms to every participant.
Report content and responses: the six-field limit on match reports and the bar on attaching anything else (§411.475(d)–(e)); the occupied/unoccupied response rules for observed matches and for subject vehicles (§§411.475–411.476). Matching implementation standards for on-vehicle matching under §411.474 (§411.481(a)(2)).
Enforcement: civil penalty liability and inadmissibility of evidence derived from a violation; suspension or revocation of feed access; and the express negatives — no criminal offence, no private right of action (§411.479). Certification mechanics: the form of the manufacturer self-certification and the mechanics of its renewal on a material change (§411.481(a)(3)).
The duty and its exemptions: the generation-triggered backstop duty; shall-grant first exemptions up to five years; the rule that safeguards are not exemptible; Texas Register publication of exemption grants (Article 2). Housekeeping mechanics: the purge schedule for the limited audit record a reporting vehicle may retain (§411.481(a)(4)); backstop generation-filing form and reclassification procedure (§411.481(a)(6)).
The non-delegation clause itself: a rule may not authorise non-alert data collection, expand report contents, treat a partial as a match, or alter the occupied/unoccupied responses (§411.481(c)). Notice presentation standards for occupant notice, within the statute's own audio-first and do-not-approach requirements (§411.481(a)(5)). One item sits on the line and is flagged below: the civil penalty amount is set by rule under the draft as written.

What the draft changes, section by section

Legal analysis

Known seams — flagged for the author and Legislative Council

Published here deliberately: a bill page that hides its drafting issues will not survive staff review, and these are mechanical rather than substantive.

Sources

The next step

Champion, endorse, testify, advise — or author. The next step is a 20-minute briefing with Lawrence Baitland, and then your yes or no.